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RECENT DECISIONS
Evidence: The Status of the Rule in the Federal Courts Concern-
ing the Competency of One Spouse's Testimony Against the Other
in Criminal Prosecutions. The defendant was charged, in the Federal
District Court of Oklahoma, with violating the Mann Act,' in that he
was alleged to have transported a girl from Arkansas to Oklahoma
for immoral purposes. At the trial, a question of fact arose as to
whether the defendant knew of the purpose of the prosecutrix in
making the trip. The defendant maintained that, although he took the
girl to Oklahoma in his car, he was unaware of her purpose in going
there and merely accommodated her incidentally to a business trip which
he was making. At this point of the trial, the United States Attorney
called the defendant's estranged wife to the stand and, over the objection
of the defendant, she testified that she was the defendant's wife, that
she was a prostitute at the time of the trip in question and that she was
a prostitute prior to her marriage to the defendant. The jury found
the defendant guilty of the charge and he was convicted and sentenced
to serve five years imprisonment. On the appeal by the defendant to
the Circuit Court, the conviction was affirmed.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Judgment of the trial court
reversed. The appearance of the defendant's wife on the stand in the
presence of the jury, and her testimony, given over the objection of
the defendant, was error. At common law, either spouse was incompe-
tent to testify for or against the other in any case, and, although this
rule has been subject to various modifications, the present rule has been
subject to various modifications, the present rule to be applied in crim-
inal cases arising in federal courts is that a wife cannot testify against
her husband without his consent, if the crime with which he is charged
involves no personal violence or moral wrong to the person of his
wife. Here, the court found from the record that the mere presence
of the defendant's wife on the stand as a witness against her husband
would most likely impress jurors adversely and strongly suggest that
the defendant might be inclined to commit such a crime as charged. In
the concurring opinion, justice Stewart states that the true test of the
rule is to whom the privilege belongs, the accused-spouse or the witness-
spouse? He concludes by saying that this is not the case to decide this
question, inasmuch as the record indicates that the testimony of the
defendant's wife was anything but voluntary, Hawkins v. United States,
U.S. -,79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1958).
This decision completely ignores the reasoning of an earlier Federal
'18 U.S.C. §2421, 18 U.S.C.A. §2421, which provides: "Whoever knowingly
transports in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose ...
shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both."
2249 F. 2d 735 (10th Cir. 1958), wherein the court relied on the reasoning of
Yoder v. United States, 80 F. 2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
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Court of Appeals case3 which had been set out by writers as a possible
break with traditional ties.4 The early common law rule, based on the
strict reasoning of England's Lord Coke that a husband and wife were,
in law, one person, barred any testimony of one spouse on behalf of
the other and, as later modified, required consent of both spouses where
adverse testimony was sought in certain types of cases. This evidentary
problem was further categorized into areas where general testimony
was barred simply because of the marital status of the parties, and
where actual communications between the parties during this status were
labeled as privileged. In this discussion of the Hawkins case, con-
sideration will be limited to the former, more general area of the status
of the parties as affecting the competency of testimony.
State law, as compared with the Federal rule6 which governs the
admission of evidence in Federal criminal actions, differs more in
language than in actual effect. Although every state has supposedly
legislated away the original common law prohibition, the majority of
the states, 7 in effect, retain, either by subsequent statutory modifications
or by judicial interpretation, the modified common law "privilege"
concept that where the spouses do not consent to adverse testimony is
not admissible.8
Federal Rule 26" is not the only federal legislation relative to this
issue. On two previous occasions, Congress enacted statutes 0 to permit
3 Yoder v. United States, supra note 2.
4 Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952).
5 1 COKE, COMMENTARY uPoN LIrrrLroN 6b (19th Ed. 1832).
c FED. RULE CRIM PROC. 26: ". . . The admissibility of evidence and the com-
petency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act
of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience."
7Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia.
8 Even at common law, the rule of incompetency was modified so as to permit
testimony by one spouse, agrieved by an act of personal violence by the other.
8 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE §2239 (1940). A minority of approximately 13 states
which retain, in statutory form, the common law concept of incompetency
also provide for an exception where a "necessity" such as polygamy, bigamy
or personal violence against the witness-spouse would permit testimony. On
the other hand, 10 states such as Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. §325.18 (1957), have
completely abolished the common law view, by making either spouse competent
to testify for or against the other in any civil or criminal action, and might
even compel a spouse, as any other witness, to so testify in some criminal
cases. Note, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952). Therefore, as mentioned above,
the majority of states which declare such testimony competent but privileged,
and the 13 states which adhere to the original "incompetency" view, are an
indication that state statutes have certainly not dimmed the rationale of the
common law and present Federal Rule.
9 Supra note 6.
1024 STAT. 635 (1887), 28 U.S.C. 633 (1946) permitted testimony by one spouse
against the other, where the spouse was being prosecuted in federal courts
for bigamy, unlawful cohabitation or polygamy. 39 STAT. 878 (1917), 8 U.S.C.
138 (1946) further modified thte common law by allowing testimony of one
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testimony of spouses in particular criminal prosecutions. But these
statutes are to be interpreted presently in light of the Federal Rule.
This rule is the codification of a Supreme Court decision which is most
significant for its holding that the federal courts are not bound by
state laws of evidence and the admissibility of evidence and competency
and privileges of witnesses should be governed by the principles of
common law as they are interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience. 1 This decision is also noted for
its holding that a spouse is now competent to testify for the other
spouse in any action, civil or criminal. As the instant case indicates,
the Mann Act raises a problem in the federal courts, inasmuch as the
common law rule of necessity of justice, which permits a wife to testify
against her husband in situations where the husband is charged with
committing either an act of personal violence or of moral injury against
his wife, cannot be technically applied where a wife was not the trans-
ported woman.
Originally, violations of the Mann Act were not considered the
type of case to permit the application of the "necessity" exception to
the common law rule of incompetency.' 2 But federal courts were
not entirely in agreement 13 and shortly, they began to find that the
Mann Act involved a crime of such moral consequence that an applica-
tion of the exception was permitted. 14 However, this line of decisions
was only applicable to situations where the wife had been aggrieved by
the husband's act of transporting and they did nothing to resolve the
problem presented by cases such as the principal one. The only decision
which has permitted testimony by a wife under such circumstances 15
seems to find its sole justification in what the court referred to as "an
enlightenment of the times which requires modification of common law
principles." Further language in this decision would have the federal
courts fall into line with the states in abolishing the common law prohibi-
tion entirely, but such a suggestion is not altogether sound if one is to
analyze the effect of the majority of the state statutes. 16
Therefore, a consideration of the instant decision in light of cases' 7
spouse where the other was charged with importing aliens for immoral
purposes.
"1 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 37 1(1933).
2Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed. 250 (8th Cir. 1915).
"3Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23 (9th Cir. 1914).
'4 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F. 2d 1006 (2nd Cir. 1943); aff'd ni rehearing,
138 F. 2d 831 (2nd Cir. 1943) ; Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (5th
Cir. 1918) ; Shores v. United States, 174 F. 2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949) overruling
Johnson v. United States, supra note 12; 3 WHARTON'S CRIINAL EVIDENCE
.783 (1955).
15 Yoder v. United States, supra note 2.
16 Supra note 8, where it is noted that complete abolishment of the common law
rule of incompetency has not been effected in a majority of the states which
merely reduce the "incompetency" to a "privilege."
'"7 Brunner v. United States, 168 F. 2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) and United States v.
Walker, 176 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949).
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subsequent to Yoder v. United States shows that the Supreme Court,
in deciding a criminal case where no personal violence or moral injury
is involved, is sound in its reasoning, if not modern in its result1s
The court, in ignoring the Yoder exception, has decided that the policy
surrounding the common law rule with its subsequent modifications
is still necessary to foster family peace and to benefit the Public, in
the preservation of the marital state. The concurring opinion is actually
a dissent to the common law and cannot be construed to be a con-
currence in reasoning. To adopt Justice Stewart's view would be to
approach the result reached in Yoder. It is unrealistic to think that
an accused spouse would ever consent to the introduction of damaging
evidence, but on the other hand, to give the privilege to a spouse called
as a witness would open the door to evidence which the majority opinion
feels must still be kept closed as a matter of policy.
EUGENE A. RANNEY
Is As far back as 1938, the American Bar Association's Committee on Improve-
ments in the Law of Evidence recommended that the privilege of a spouse
not to be compelled to testify against the other be abolished in both civil and
criminal cases. 63 AMER. BAR AssN. REP. 595 (1938).
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